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I
INTRODUCTION
Professor Robert Mnookin was prescient in pointing to the conundrum
judges would face in applying the “best interests” standard in the absence of a
1
legislative definition of “best.” He called attention to this problem just as
gender-neutral laws were undermining the presumption that children of “tender
2
years” are best reared by their mother, unless she is “unfit.” Even following
decades of judicial (and parental) uncertainty, law and society have failed to
embrace a clear, enduring, and widely accepted definition of children’s best
3
interests. Legislatures continue to experiment with various definitions, but
these developments largely reflect tensions between fathers’ rights and mothers’
rights advocates, rather than a clear solution to the indeterminacy problem or a
4
definitive articulation of what might be best for children.
While anticipating one huge problem, Professor Mnookin could not foresee
another: the growing number of parents for whom judicial intervention would
become relevant, and frequently would be requested, in the decades that
followed. Separated, divorced, and never-married (whether cohabiting or not)
parents with children under the age of eighteen all are potential candidates for
5
judicial intervention in custody matters. Today, slightly less than half of all first
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1. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 226–27 (Summer 1975).
2. Id. at 235.
3. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2
(2002).
4. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The
Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 69.
5. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 232. Mnookin discussed two different functions that courts can
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marriages end within twenty years (48% for women, 44% for men), and close
7
to half of children are born outside of marriage (40.8% in 2010). Moreover,
8
only about half of unmarried parents are cohabiting at the time of childbirth,
and cohabiting relationships are even more likely to dissolve than are
9
marriages.
The huge number of separated, divorced, and never-married parents who
might, and do, appeal to the courts for resolution of their childrearing
disagreements has created a problem and a paradox. The practical problem is
that courts are overburdened with custody disputes. In fact, custody disputes
10
are now the most common reason for a legal filing in the United States.
Family-court judges decide what is “best” for the children of separated,
divorced, and never-married parents, often down to the minutiae of weekly
schedules, holidays, schooling, extracurricular activities, and perhaps even
appropriate eating and clothing habits. The paradox is that courts in the United
States have consistently refused to hear similar disputes between married
11
parents, viewing such efforts as contrary to public policy.
Even without considering the different treatment of married parents, one
might wonder, If there were no system currently in place, might legislatures shy
away from creating a means for judges to intervene in the intimate decisions
made by parents for about half of all American children? Would legislatures be
even more reluctant facing the fact that no child-protection issues typically are
involved in these parenting disputes? Would present-day lawmaking be
influenced by the reality that separation, divorce, cohabitation, and nonmarital
perform in child-custody disputes: private dispute settlement involving disputes between adults with
conflicting claims to a relationship with a child (commonly referred to as custody disputes) and child
protection involving judicial enforcement of minimal rules of parental behavior designed to protect and
preserve a child’s well-being (commonly called abuse and neglect proceedings). Id. at 229. The bestinterests standard informs both judicial functions; however, the present article focuses only on custody
disputes between biological parents, probably the most controversial area of debate about defining
children’s best interests. Id. at 229–30. Although we focus on private custody disputes, we underscor
child-protection issues in one, vital way: In many contexts, judicial intervention in private custody
disputes should be circumscribed and limited to cases that raise clear child-protection issues. Id. at 229.
6. Casey E. Copen et al., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., First Marriages in the United
States: Data from the 2006–2010 National Survey of Family Growth, NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP., Mar.
22, 2012, at 1, 7, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr049.pdf.
7. Joyce A. Martin et al., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Births: Final data for 2010,
NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Aug. 28, 2012, at 1, 8, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/
nvsr61_01.pdf.
8. Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sara McLanahan, The Living Arrangements of New Unmarried
Mothers, 39 DEMOGRAPHY 415, 415 (2002).
9. See ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND
THE FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY 17 (2009). Although U.S. courts could hear custody disputes
between unmarried parents who are cohabiting, such disputes can be expected to be far more frequent
between unmarried parents who are living apart or who break up.
10. ANDREW SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS
FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 38–39 (2004).
11. See Robert E. Emery & Kimberly C. Emery, Should Courts or Parents Make Child-Rearing
Decisions?: Married Parents as a Paradigm for Parents Who Live Apart, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365,
367 (2008).
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birth are routine demographically and broadly accepted socially? Might
legislatures be concerned about venturing into the family lives and parenting
decisions of almost half of all American families for both practical reasons (such
as concern about overburdening courts) and philosophical reasons (such as
12
equal-protection concerns )?
In part II of this article we explore alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for
parents who are disputing various issues concerning child custody. We argue
that mediation and other types of ADR offer one of the most hopeful solutions
to the problems produced by indeterminacy and demography. As is
documented by a growing body of empirical research, encouraging parental
self-determination in mediation and other forms of ADR is not only a practical
solution to these twin complications; it is perhaps the wisest one.
Yet it is impossible to embark on a discussion of the benefits of parental
self-determination without calling attention to the irony that is explored in part
III of this article. Noting the benefits of private dispute resolution for separated,
divorced, and never-married parents is perhaps little more than a recognition
that these families are not so different from married families. As is shown in
part III, social, psychological, and legal conceptions of these “alternative”
family forms have evolved rapidly. Scholars and practitioners now refer to the
13
“renegotiation” rather than the end of family relationships and to
14
“coparenting” across households instead of “single” parents. Similarly,
contemporary law is increasingly abandoning older terms, such as “custodial”
and “noncustodial” parents, together with the concepts they embody, in favor
15
of new terms and concepts, such as “joint custody” and “parenting plans.”
All of these changes underscore a vital point. Like married parents, parents
who live apart—ideally and in practice—maintain relationships not only with
their children but also with each other. Because of this, protecting the
coparenting relationship is an important public-policy goal for both married
families and for families in which parents live apart, a goal that might trump
12. We envision a time when parents who live apart successfully argue against state intervention in
their parenting decisions based on equal-protection arguments. To date, several such cases have been
brought, but none have yet proven successful. See, e.g., Matter of Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488
(Colo. App. 1996) (holding that an adoption statute did not violate children’s right to equal protection,
although the statute treated children differently for purposes of stepparent adoption based on whether
the person seeking adoption was married to children’s natural parent); Neudecker v. Neudecker, 577
N.E.2d 960 (Ind. 1991) (holding that a statute authorizing the trial court to order either or both parents
to pay sums for children’s college education did not violate the noncustodial-support obligor’s equalprotection rights, even though a married parent could unilaterally refuse to pay for college education);
Barnes v. Barnes, 107 P.3d 560 (Okla. 2005) (holding that a distinction between divorcing parents, who
were subject to Parenting Coordinator Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 120.3 (Supp. 2003), and married
parents or divorcing couples, who were not subject to the Act, was not grounds for an equal-protection
challenge to the trial court’s appointment of a parenting coordinator).
13. See ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD
CUSTODY, AND MEDIATION 18 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS].
14. See id. at 63.
15. See id. at 102–03.
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well-intentioned efforts by the courts to intervene to protect children’s best
interests. Perhaps the lesson learned is that courts do best when treating the
separated, divorced, or unmarried half of American parents as they do the
married half: by staying out of parental disputes.
The present argument stops short of suggesting that courts should entirely
surrender their private dispute–settlement function in the child-custody arena.
Instead, two modest proposals are made. First, the law should defer to
agreements between parents who live apart for the same reasons that the
judiciary refuses to enter disagreements between married parents: respecting
parental autonomy and encouraging cooperative coparenting. Second, courts
can and should refuse to hear some disputes between parents who live apart, as
is done for all disputes between married parents.
In part IV of this article we highlight the potential benefits of taking
significant steps in the direction of respecting the ability of separated, divorced,
and never-married parents to make autonomous, child-focused, and
relationship-preserving coparenting decisions. Specifically, we argue that (1) in
the absence of child-protection concerns, judicial review of parenting plans
should be eliminated for cases in which parents agree; (2) contracts between
parents, such as ADR contracts (for example, those imposing mandatory
arbitration) or parenting-plan contracts (for example, those mandating plans
that evolve over time) should be honored and enforced; and (3) access to the
courts can and should be limited whether in the context of promoting ADR
(such as mandatory mediation) or reducing repeat litigation (for example, by
refusing to hear trivial parenting disputes, or by raising the threshold for a
“change of circumstances” needed to justify relitigation). Finally, we conclude
that the answer to the question, Who knows what is best for children? is their
parents—whether married or unmarried.
II
INDETERMINACY AS ONE RATIONALE FOR MEDIATION
Professor Mnookin stated,
The problems posed by the use of an indeterminate standard, coupled with the
difficulties of formulating more precise rules that would dispose of many cases, invite
explicit consideration of modes of dispute resolution other than traditional
adjudication. Since a primary goal for cases of these sorts should be facilitating private
resolutions, mediation is an obvious possibility. A negotiated settlement has
considerable advantages over one imposed by a court. The adults seeking custody
16
avoid the cost—both financial and emotional—of an adversary proceeding.

Parental self-determination is indeed an important rationale for mediation
and other forms of ADR that encourage the private ordering of parents’
preferences on issues falling under the umbrella of child custody (for example,
time with each parent, major parenting decisions, and perhaps some aspects of
practical day-to-day parenting, such as scheduling extracurricular activities).
16. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 287–88.

5_EMERY & EMERY_EIC (RECOVERED) (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2014]

WHO KNOWS WHAT IS BEST FOR CHILDREN?

7/18/2014 9:39 AM

155

Not many years after Mnookin offered his argument for mediation, one author
17
of this article highlighted another significant consideration. A solid and
growing body of psychological literature increasingly pointed to conflict
between parents as a key contributor to the psychological struggles found too
18
often among children from divorced families. Robert Emery asked, If parental
conflict is detrimental to children from divorced families, might it be contrary to
children’s best interests to encourage parents to resolve their disputes through
the adversary system? Are the best interests of children better served by
diverting parents from court and encouraging them to resolve custody disputes
in mediation or in other, nonadversarial forums? In fact, at the same time many
judges, lawyers, mental-health professionals, and parents were expressing
growing dissatisfaction with traditional legal methods of attempting to settle
19
child-custody disputes. When combined with Professor Mnookin’s arguments
20
about indeterminacy, mediation seemed to be a promising solution to two
major problems posed by child-custody disputes in latter part of the twentieth
century.
A. Does Mediation Help Parents Decide?
Mnookin offered mediation as a theoretical solution to the problem of the
21
indeterminacy of the best-interests standard. His home state at the time,
California, soon embarked on a real-world experiment in mediating custody
disputes. On January 1, 1981, California became the first state to mandate that
all parents must attempt mediation before a court hearing concerning custody
22
23
issues could be scheduled, a law that is still in effect. The experiment was
quickly met with success, at least in terms of a reduction in the need for judicial
decisionmaking. For example, one early report found that 55% of disputing
parents in the Los Angeles County mediation program reached an agreement in
24
mediation. A later statewide study of California’s program of mandatory
mediation found that, in 1388 cases, 46% of couples settled within two weeks of
their first mediation appointment, while another 20% of couples scheduled
25
appointments for further mediation.
17. See generally Robert E. Emery, Interparental Conflict and the Children of Discord and
Divorce, 92 PSYCHOL. BULL. 310 (1982).
18. See id. at 313.
19. Robert E. Emery & Melissa M. Wyer, Divorce Mediation, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 472, 473
(1987).
20. Id. at 473 (citing Professor Mnookin’s arguments prominently).
21. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 287–89.
22. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West 1981). It is not known whether Mnookin was aware of efforts to
mandate mediation at the time of writing the 1975 article, or if perhaps the article and Mnookin himself
were an impetus for reform.
23. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170 (West 2013).
24. Hugh McIsaac, Court-Connected Mediation, 21 CONCILIATION CTS. REV., Dec. 1983, at 49, 54
[hereinafter McIsaac, Court-Connected Mediation].
25. Charlene E. Depner, Karen V. Cannata & Marlene B. Simon, Building a Uniform Statistical
Reporting System: A Snapshot of California Family Court Services, 30 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS.

5_EMERY & EMERY_EIC (RECOVERED) (DO NOT DELETE)

156

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

7/18/2014 9:39 AM

[Vol. 77:151

Although even mandatory mediation leaves many cases unresolved, these
settlement rates represent an impressive reduction in the need for judges to
decide custody cases. However, one might question whether parents in many of
these same cases would have settled anyway after filing for a custody hearing,
either with the help of their attorneys or on their own. One might also ask
whether the mandatory-mediation law, or perhaps enthusiasm for the new
settlement technique, inflated the rates of settlement in California.
Fortunately, experimental research, where families are assigned at random
to mediation or continued adversary settlement, has shown that mediation
causes a substantial reduction in the need for court hearings. For example, a
study of families who were recruited at the time of filing (as in California) and
randomly assigned to either a relatively brief form of mediation (again like
California) or to continued litigation found that (1) a judicial decision was
required in 72% of cases randomly assigned to continued litigation (28% settled
out of court after filing), while (2) only 11% of subjects randomly assigned to
mediation needed a judge to make a final decision (77% settled in mediation,
26
and 11% settled out of court after mediation failed to produce an agreement).
27
This difference is statistically and substantively significant. Moreover,
numerous studies of mediation from other states and in other countries
similarly show that mediation-settlement rates typically range from 50% to
28
85%. In short, mediation causes a substantial reduction in the need for judges
to decide custody cases across a variety of programs, contexts, and jurisdictions.
Undoubtedly, different mediators and styles of mediation produce higher or
lower rates of settlement. Perhaps the key factor, one that was debated from the
beginning of California’s mandatory program, is whether mediation should
29
remain confidential. In confidential mediation, if no agreement is reached,
mediators neither agree to testify nor can they be compelled to do so in future
legal actions. Alternatively, mediation might not be confidential such that, if
needed, the information obtained during the process could be used to make an
informed recommendation to the court.
It is of interest that the Los Angeles area followed the confidential route,
30
while the San Francisco area did not. As noted, agreement rates in the Los
31
Angeles mediation program were 55%. In San Francisco, by contrast, one
superior-court judge reported that his caseload dropped from five to fifteen

REV. 185, 197 (1992).
26. Robert E. Emery, Sheila G. Matthews & Melissa M. Wyer, Child Custody Mediation and
Litigation: Further Evidence on the Differing Views of Mothers and Fathers, 59 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 410, 412 (1991).
27. Id.
28. Joan B. Kelly, A Decade of Divorce Mediation Research: Some Answers and Questions, 34
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 373, 375 (1996).
29. See generally Hugh McIsaac, Confidentiality: An Exploration of Issues, 8 MEDIATION Q. 57
(1985).
30. Id. at 60.
31. See McIsaac, Court-Connected Mediation, supra note 24, at 54.
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cases per day to five cases in the entire year following the enactment of
32
mandatory mediation, and just three through November of the next year. This
marked a virtual elimination of judicial intervention in custody disputes.
What explains this dramatic difference? In mediation that is not
confidential, mediators typically reveal what their recommendation will likely
be should the process fail, a procedure sometimes referred to as “muscle
mediation.” A mediator might say, for example, “You have every right to take
this matter to court, but if you do, you should know that I will recommend that
the judge order the exact schedule that we have just been discussing. You also
should know that judges in this court almost always follow my recommendation,
and that the legal process is very expensive and time consuming. So, do you
want to rethink your position on the acceptability of this parenting plan?”
Not surprisingly, such speculations “encourage” parents to settle. The
present authors are in favor of maintaining the confidentiality of mediation, an
approach that highlights parental self-determination and the facilitative role of
33
the mediator. In effect, mediation that is not confidential is a mediation–
arbitration (med-arb) process, in which the mediator becomes the arbitrator if
mediation fails. As such, mediation that is not confidential presaged future
developments in ADR, particularly the use of custody evaluations as settlement
procedures and parenting coordination. These two methods are discussed
shortly, and it is argued that these and other alternatives can be used if and
after confidential mediation does not end in agreement.
B. Is Mediation More Family Friendly?
Before turning to other dispute-resolution methods, evidence pertaining to a
second rationale for mediation deserves brief consideration. As noted earlier,
mediation was touted not only as a means of resolving the indeterminacy
dilemma but also as a more “family friendly” intervention that would reduce or
at least not exacerbate family conflict, perhaps to the benefit of individual
34
family members and their ongoing relationships.
Although not a major focus of the present analysis, many predictions about
the potential benefits (or protective effects) of mediation have been supported
in empirical research. Most notably, a major study of mediation versus
adversary settlement randomly assigned families to the two conditions and
35
followed parents and children over the course of twelve years. This study
found that (1) parents were more satisfied with mediation than adversary
settlement immediately after resolving their disputes, eighteen months later,

32. Donald B. King, Handling Custody and Visitation Disputes Under the New Mandatory
Mediation Law, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1982, at 40, 41.
33. See EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 13, at 143.
34. See Emery & Wyer, supra note 19, at 474.
35. See generally Robert E. Emery, Lisa Laumann-Billings, Mary C. Waldron, David A. Sbarra &
Peter Dillon, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Custody, Contact, and Co-parenting 12 Years
After Initial Dispute Resolution, 69 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 323 (2001).
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36

and twelve years later, (2) nonresidential parents who mediated maintained
significantly and substantially more involvement in their children’s lives over
the course of their children’s entire childhood (that is, at the twelve-year follow37
up), (3) residential parents rated the quality of nonresidential parents’
relationship with their children as significantly better across multiple domains
twelve years after dispute settlement in mediation versus through adversary
38
procedures, and (4) despite the increased opportunities for parental conflict
(because of both parents’ continued involvement in their children’s lives),
twelve years later parents who mediated reported significantly less child-related
39
conflict than parents who litigated.
In regard to conflict, it should be noted that mediation appeared to offer
40
both direct benefits and protective effects. Specifically, a decrease in parental
conflict was found following mediation, while an increase in conflict was found
41
following adversary settlement. Thus, it appears that, on average, mediation
can both lead to an improvement in the coparenting relationship, and also
prevent any deterioration of this relationship following adversary settlement.
C. A Hierarchy of Dispute-Resolution Alternatives
Mediation can apparently both help families in dispute and lead to
settlement of at least half of cases otherwise destined for judicial settlement.
However, mediation will not lead to settlement of all parental disagreements. In
fact, Professor Mnookin did not expect mediation to resolve all custody
42
disputes. Professor Mnookin explained, “Even if mediation is successful in
43
some cases, unresolved disputes will remain.”
Yet Professor Mnookin appears to have been overly pessimistic about an
ADR procedure he considered but dismissed:
In the application of a broad, person-oriented standard, a more “intimate” form of
adjudication or arbitration might be highly desirable. If the disputing parents could
agree on the choice of a “judge” and the “judge” knew the family, the custody
decision might better reflect an intuitive appreciation of the parties’ values,
44
psychology, and goals. The decision might also be more acceptable to the parents.

Focusing on the role of community leaders in resolving disputes in certain small,
nonindustrialized cultures, Professor Mnookin went on to say, “[A]lthough a
more intimate form of adjudication might be desirable, it is unclear that such a

36. Id. at 331.
37. Id. at 330.
38. Id. at 326.
39. David A. Sbarra & Robert E. Emery, Deeper Into Divorce: Using Actor–Partner Analyses to
Explore Systemic Differences in Co-parenting Conflict Following Custody Dispute Resolution, 22 J.
FAM. PSYCHOL. 144, 150 (2008).
40. Id. at 149.
41. Id.
42. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 289.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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45

system could be implemented on a broad scale.”
In fact, a number of new ADR techniques have been developed in recent
decades, all offering separated, divorced, and never-married parents a more
intimate, less formal, and hopefully more family-friendly forum for attempting
to resolve their custody disputes. If the recommendations offered herein were
put into practice, this would encourage the development of an even broader
range of more personal and personalized dispute-resolution alternatives.
1. Custody Evaluations as a Settlement Technique
In addition to mediation, one new ADR procedure is the use of expert
psychological evaluations, not to provide courts with evidence relevant to
judicial decisionmaking, but to encourage parents to settle their disputes. A
variation on this general method is called “early neutral evaluation,” in which a
relatively brief, informal, and inexpensive custody evaluation is conducted by
an experienced evaluator early in the parental dispute. The evaluator makes a
confidential recommendation to the parents, one that is presumed to reflect
46
what might be concluded following a full-scale evaluation-as-usual. Thus, early
neutral evaluations essentially are a form of nonbinding arbitration, undertaken
with the explicit goal of encouraging settlement. In fact, one study found that
the procedure led to the full settlement of 51% of cases, and the partial
47
settlement of another 12%. Only 23% of cases assigned to early neutral
48
evaluation went on to a full custody evaluation.
2. Parenting Coordination
Parenting coordination is a second new dispute-resolution procedure, which
49
explicitly follows a med-arb model. A parenting coordinator first works with
parents in dispute to help them mediate a resolution to their disagreements. If
mediation fails to produce an agreement, however, the mediator becomes an
arbitrator and orders a binding resolution. As in “muscle mediation,” parenting
coordinators might voice their likely decision prior to making a formal ruling to
encourage a mediated settlement. Although the mediation phase of the process
typically is confidential, parenting coordination is no longer confidential once it
moves into arbitration. Unlike muscle mediation, however, the parenting
coordinator is explicit about his or her arbitration role from the beginning of
the process, and the authority to make decisions is delegated to the parenting
coordinator by the parents, the appropriate judge, or both. Parents retain the

45. Id.
46. See Jordan L. Santeramo, Early Neutral Evaluation in Divorce Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 321,
325 (2004).
47. Yvonne Pearson, Early Neutral Evaluations: Applications to Custody and Parenting Time
Cases in Program Development and Implementation in Hennepin County, Minnesota, 44 FAM. CT. REV.
672, 673 (2006).
48. Id. at 680.
49. See generally Matthew J. Sullivan, Parenting Coordination: Coming of Age?, 51 FAM. CT. REV.
56 (2013).

5_EMERY & EMERY_EIC (RECOVERED) (DO NOT DELETE)

160

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

7/18/2014 9:39 AM

[Vol. 77:151

right to appeal a parenting coordinator’s decision in court.
Currently, parenting coordination is used primarily to manage high-conflict,
50
repeat-litigation cases. Parents have already had their day in court, perhaps a
great many days. Parents might be ordered into the process or might seek it out
voluntarily, signing a contract giving the parenting coordinator decisionmaking
authority. Because ultimate authority for deciding child custody rests with
judges, it is essential for parenting coordinators to reach an understanding with
local judges as to the nature and extent of their decisionmaking authority.
Typically, decisions reached in parenting coordination are narrower in scope
than those imposed by judges, and limited to deciding issues that require a
pressing decision (such as the schedule for an upcoming holiday) rather than
51
broad, far-reaching decisions (such as ordering a change in primary residence).
Although currently limited in scope, the parenting coordination process is
still evolving. One can easily envision the process becoming broader. For
example, parents who are not in high conflict might enter the process
voluntarily, perhaps prior to or instead of litigation. Parents might choose to
extend the authority of a parenting coordinator, agreeing to ask them to make
broad and basic decisions about legal and physical custody, if needed. In one
sense, parenting coordinators might become the “wise elders,” of a sort, who
offer the more intimate form of adjudication that Professor Mnookin
contemplated decades ago. In another sense, binding arbitration in the form of
parenting coordination, or some variation of that technique, appears to be
poised to become a form of ADR used more broadly and more frequently in all
kinds of custody matters.
There is, however, one very important obstacle to this forward movement.
As is discussed shortly, in most states, parents cannot sign valid contracts
committing themselves to binding arbitration for custody matters. The courts’
parens patriae role in determining children’s best interests voids these contracts,
a circumstance that, it is argued, undermines parental autonomy, cooperative
coparenting, and a valuable form of ADR.
3. A Dispute-Resolution Funnel
Encouraging parents to make their own decisions through multiple forms of
dispute resolution is one extensive and still growing solution to the problems
posed by (1) the indeterminacy of the best-interests standard, (2) the explosion
in separation, divorce, and nonmarital childbearing, and (3) the perceived and
demonstrated benefits of more family friendly, less adversarial disputeresolution techniques. A range of dispute-resolution alternatives have been
created that can be visualized to form the shape of a funnel. Procedures nearer
the wider top of the funnel are used more commonly and are generally more
informal, less adversarial, and involve greater autonomy in parental
50. See Christine A. Coates, Robin Deutsch, Hugh Starnes, Matthew J. Sullivan & Bea Lisa
Sydlik, Parenting Coordination for High-Conflict Families, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 246, 246–47 (2004).
51. See id. at 248–49.
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adjudication
n and parentting coordina
ation. Such a system wo
ould greatly rreduce a
judge’s role
e as an arbitter of custod
dy disputes. Instead, jud
dges would become
essential ad
dvocates for ADR, adm
ministrators in overseein
ng parents’ passage
through mu
ultiple ADR efforts, and
d arm twisteers in encou
uraging pareents, and
52
attorneys, to
o reach a setttlement out of court.
The disp
pute-resolutiion funnel in
ncludes both
h new forms of ADR an
nd older,
king “aroun
informal me
ethods, notab
bly parental decisionmak
nd the kitcheen table”
and settlem
ments resultin
ng from attorney negottiations, inclluding collaaborative
53
law. In factt, in his colla
aboration with psychologgist Eleanor Maccoby, P
Professor
52. See Le
eonard Edwards, Comments on the Miller Com
mmission Report:t: A California P
Perspective,
27 PACE L. REV
V. 627 (2007).
53. See gen
nerally Elizabeth
h Strickland, Pu
utting “Counselo
or” Back in the Lawyer’s Job D
Description:
Why More Sta
ates Should Ado
opt Collaborative Law Statutees, 84 N.C. L. REV. 979, 983––86 (2006)
(describing gen
nerally how the collaborative-law
c
w process workss). Collaborativve lawyers and th
heir clients
sign contracts agreeing
a
that the
e attorneys will not
n represent th
heir clients if a caase should go to
o trial. This
encourages setttlement and is pe
erhaps the key to
t the collaborattive-law processs, which might aalso include
other condition
ns such as agreein
ng to an open sh
haring of eviden
nce and negotiatting in good faith
h.
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Mnookin em
mpirically de
emonstrated the value o
of a system tthat looks m
much like
54
the dispute-resolution funnel. In
n their stud y of courtss in two California
counties, Maccoby
M
an
nd Mnookin
n found th at informall dispute-reesolution
alternatives “filtered ou
ut” so many conflicts thaat only 1.5%
% of their saample of
55
y cases requ
uired a judg
ge to make a final rulin
ng. Althou
ugh they
933 custody
portrayed th
heir findingss in the form
m of a conflicct pyramid w
with greater conflicts
56
at the top, th
he pyramid can
c be invertted to look liike a funnel..

Clearly, the various metthods of disp
pute resoluttion reduce tthe need forr judicial
decisionmak
king.
Part of the reason
n for embrracing vario
ous custodyy dispute–reesolution
alternatives is practicall. Judges arre overwhellmed with tthe relatively small
percentage of
o cases thatt come in fro
ont of them,, let alone th
he far larger number
that they miight be asked
d to decide iff not for otheer dispute-reesolution meethods.
Yet, there is also a philosophica
p
al shift repreesented in th
he embrace o
of ADR
and parenta
al self-deterrmination. Concerns
C
ab out the besst-interests sstandard
might be fa
arther reach
hing than vague law. C
Couples tod
day increasin
ngly are
questioning the need fo
or social and
d legal regu
ulation of th
heir relationsships, as
indicated by the demo
ographics cited earlier and by thee oft heard phrase,
“marriage iss just a piece
e of paper.” A corollary tto doubting the relevancce of law
in relationship formatio
on is questiioning the llegal regulation of relaationship
dissolution. Philosophiccally, the emphasis on
n ADR raisses the question of
whether or how much the
t law shou
uld be involvved in the b
break-up of intimate
and coparen
nting relation
nships. Perha
aps the legall system sho
ould not get iinvolved
in (some) co
onflicts betw
ween parentss who live aapart, maybee even when
n parents
ask them to do so. Ironiically, this would mean tthat the legaal system wou
uld treat
separated, divorced,
d
and
d never-marrried parents more like m
married paren
nts.

54. ELEAN
NOR E. MACCO
OBY & ROBERT
T H. MNOOKIN
N, DIVIDING T
THE CHILD: SO
OCIAL AND
LEGAL DILEMM
MAS OF CUSTOD
DY 137 (1992).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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III
SHOULD COURTS REFUSE TO DECIDE CUSTODY CONFLICTS?
In People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson the New York Court of Appeals issued
what would appear to be a compelling and concise philosophical rationale for
mediation and other forms of ADR in child-custody conflicts.
Dispute between parents when it does not involve anything immoral or harmful to the
welfare of the child is beyond the reach of the law. The vast majority of matters
concerning the upbringing of children must be left to the conscience, patience, and
self-restraint of father and mother. No end of difficulties would arise should judges try
57
to tell parents how to bring up their children.

In Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, an Alabama court similarly opined, “Never has the
court put itself in the place of the parents and interposed its judgment as to the
course which otherwise amicable parents should pursue in discharging their
58
parental duty.”
A. Courts Refuse to Hear Disputes Between Married Parents
59

60

The Sisson ruling dates to 1936. The Kilgrow ruling was issued in 1958.
Both cases involve deep divides between parents about the most appropriate
schooling—the “best” schooling—for their children. Both courts refused to hear
the disputes as matter of public policy, not because of the topic or because of a
philosophical preference for alternate dispute resolution, but rather because the
Sissons and the Kilgrows were married.
American courts have consistently refused to enter disputes between
married parents, because “no end of difficulties would arise” if they did so.
Courts in various states have determined that refusing to hear such disputes,
even if a decision might prove helpful in the individual case, ultimately
promotes the broader, more important policy goals of (1) respecting the
autonomy of married parents to make decisions about their children, and (2)
protecting the benefits of cooperation in the marital relationship from the
61
intrusion of litigation. Yet courts in the United States routinely and repeatedly
enter the exact same disputes when they occur between parents who are
separated, divorced, or never married. Is one category of parents really that
different from the other?
B. Separated, Divorced, and Never-Married Families Are Families
Socially and psychologically, parents who lived apart were probably quite
62
different from married parents in 1936 or 1958, the dates of the Sisson and
57. 2 N.E.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. 1936).
58. 107 So. 2d 885, 888 (Ala. 1958).
59. Sisson, 2 N.E.2d 660.
60. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885.
61. See Emery & Emery, supra note 11, at 388.
62. Of course, views of marriage are evolving too. For example, marriage increasingly has become
a relational contract as opposed to a status, a reconceptualization that also shrinks differences between
married parents and parents living apart. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a
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Kilgrow rulings. Unwed motherhood, separation, and divorce were certainly
viewed as troubled and troubling arrangements during those times. Today,
however, separated, divorced, cohabiting, and never-married parents are not so
different from married parents in terms of demographics, selection into their
63
family status, or social expectations for their parenting and coparenting
relationships.
The “new normal” of separation, divorce, cohabitation, and nonmarital
childbearing is reflected in the sweeping demographic changes in American
families over the last several decades, as documented earlier. Changing views of
what makes a family also are reflected in social-science scholarship. Two
overriding themes are that (1) separated, divorced, and never-married families
are families, families where relationships extend across households and (2)
because children’s relationships with both of their parents are important
psychologically, socially, and economically, the parents’ ongoing coparenting
relationship is a key to the children’s and the family’s healthy adjustment.
For example, in 1980 Constance Ahrons wrote the following about what she
called the “binuclear family”:
To separate their spousal from their parental roles, divorcing spouses need to establish
new rules that will redefine their continuing relationship. . . . Each parent needs to
establish an independent relationship with the child; the process of continuing parentchild relationships, however, also requires that former spouses continue to be
interdependent. Within this continued interdependency, new rules and behavior
developed by former spouses toward
one another can be expected to have
64
repercussions for all family members.

Echoing these themes, in 1994, Robert Emery wrote in Renegotiating Family
Relationships,
Parents do not divorce their children, and because of this, they can never completely
divorce each other. Children form a continuing tie between former spouses, who
remain parents throughout their lives. Thus, former partners must disentangle their
continuing role as parents from the past role as spouses . . . In many cases, the key to
the successful renegotiation of all family relationships following separation
and
65
divorce lies in redefining the boundary of intimacy between the former partners.

The titles of self-help books written for parents who live apart also reflect
the idea that, in families that extend across households, children can maintain
valuable relationships with both of their parents, and this makes former
partners’ coparenting relationship a critical, ongoing influence on children’s
Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1333 (1998).
63. When these alternative family forms were rarer, personal and relationship problems very likely
formed the basis for a greater number of separations, divorces, or nonmarital births than such problems
do today, when about half of the population is familiar with one of these family experiences. One
indicator of this historical change is U.S. Presidents. Ronald Reagan was the first U.S. President who
had been divorced, while Bill Clinton and Barack Obama were both products of “broken homes.” BILL
CLINTON, MY LIFE 4–5 (2004); BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE
AND INHERITANCE 5 (Three Rivers Press 2004) (1995); RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE 92
(1990).
64. Constance Ahrons, Redefining the Divorced Family: A Conceptual Framework for Post
Divorce Family Systems Reorganization, 25 SOC. WORK 437, 437–38 (1980).
65. See EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 13, at 33.
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well-being. Some examples of titles include Mom’s House, Dad’s House; ExEtiquette for Parents; and The Good Divorce. Even the popular children’s
character, Barney, has a song about how families are not defined by marriage or
households:
A family is people and
A family is love,
That’s a family.
They come in all different sizes
and different kinds,
But mine is just right for me,
66
Yeah, mine is right for me.

The song continues with examples of different family forms including a nuclear
family, a girl whose parents live apart, and a boy who lives with his
67
grandmother.
C. Changing Legal Terms and Views
New views of separated, divorced, and never-married parents are reflected
in the legal system’s embrace of ADR, as previously discussed, and also in
changing legal terminology. The most prominent example of new legal terms
and the evolving views reflected therein is the concept of joint custody,
68
introduced for the first time in 1957 in North Carolina. Joint legal custody
involves shared parental decisionmaking, while joint physical custody is shared
time (often defined as a minimum of 25%–35% of the children’s time with each
parent). Joint custody was embraced rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s. This trend
has been empirically documented in the state of Wisconsin, where social
scientists collected perhaps the best available data on the topic. In 1980, 18% of
a representative sample of Wisconsin divorce agreements indicated that families
69
shared joint legal custody; by 2001, the proportion increased to 87%. In 1980,
fewer than 3% of families in the same study shared joint physical custody, but
by 2001, 32% of families had joint physical custody specified in their
70
agreements.
Legal terms have changed in other ways. The overriding trend has been to
replace the terms “custody” and “visitation,” which reflect the view that when
parents live apart children have only one primary or “real” parent. Like joint
custody, these new legal terms are more “family friendly,” and reflect the basic
idea that parents are still parents and families are still families when parents live
apart. In its detailed agenda for legal reform, the American Law Institute (ALI)
embraced many new terms, for example, replacing “custody agreement” with
66. See Barney & Friends: My Family’s Just Right for Me (PBS television Broadcast Apr. 7, 1992).
67. Id.
68. Jay Folberg, Custody Overview, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 5 (Jay Folberg
ed., 1984).
69. Lawrence M. Berger et al., The Stability of Shared Child Physical Placements in Recent Cohorts
of Divorced Wisconsin Families 5–6 (Inst. for Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 1329-07,
2007), available at http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/dps/pdfs/dp132907.pdf.
70. Id.
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“parenting plan.” The ALI similarly dropped the terms “custody,” and
“visitation,” focusing instead on “custodial responsibility” for allocating time
71
and “decision-making responsibility” for allocating parental authority.
D. Coming Between Parents and Children
There is one more critical complication that results from judicial
intervention in disputes between separated, divorced, and never-married
parents. In becoming involved in custody conflicts, the courts not only interpose
themselves in the relationship between parents, but also enter the relationship
between each parent and his or her children. This is because of the court’s
parens patriae duty to protect children and make decisions in their best interests,
not their parents’ interests.
In refusing to enter disputes between married parents, the law assumes that
the interests of married parents and children are aligned, except in cases of
abuse or neglect. In entering disputes between separated, divorced, and nevermarried parents, the courts implicitly makes the assumption, under their parens
patriae duty, that the interests of this category of parents are not aligned with
those of their children. This implicit assumption is revealed in judicial authority
to overturn agreements between parents who live apart, even when those
agreements are merely filed with some other legal objective in mind, for
72
example, obtaining a divorce.
Even though judges routinely “rubber stamp” parenting plans produced by
agreement, a number of problems are created by the courts’ parens patriae duty
and its resulting authority to overrule parental agreements, as is explored
shortly.
E. Treating Parents Who Live Apart More Like Married Parents
Contemporary social and legal views of parents who live apart seek to
promote and respect both parents’ relationships with their children. In so doing,
these views also recognize the value of cooperation in the ongoing, coparenting
relationship. Thus, the logic of judicial rulings justifying the courts’ refusal to
enter childrearing conflicts between married parents increasingly applies to
separated, divorced, and unmarried parents too. If parents who live apart have
a relationship that is not so different from that of married parents, one wonders,
is the wisdom of legal rulings about married parents also applicable to the
problems created when the law attempts to insert itself in decisions made by
73
parents who live apart?
71. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.03 (2002).
72. See generally Linda Jellum, Parents Know Best: Revising Our Approach to Parental Custody
Agreements, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 615 (2004).
73. Some commentators have argued that Supreme Court decisions indicate that separated,
divorced, and never-married parents, like married parents, have a fundamental, constitutional right to
make parenting decisions. See id. at 644. This argument would seem to raise equal-protection issues
about the state’s involvement in one category of parental decisions but not the other. Although
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There is a need for explicit legal recognition of the importance of limiting
conflict and promoting coparenting cooperation between parents who live
apart. For reasons elaborated upon below, two modest but important steps in
this direction are to (1) accept agreements between parents who live apart as
being in children’s best interests—to the exclusion of all other best-interests
considerations—and (2) refuse to hear some disputes between parents who live
apart.
IV
TOWARD LIMITING JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN DISPUTES BETWEEN
PARENTS LIVING APART
Although we argue that separated, divorced, and never-married parents
should be treated more like married parents, we do recognize that American
courts are not about to refuse to hear any and all child-custody disputes, nor are
legislatures likely to restrict judicial authority to hear these cases. Yet it is more
than a thought experiment to raise the question, Why do American courts
routinely intervene in disputes between parents living apart, while refusing to
hear similar disputes between parents who are married? What theory underlies
this posture? What are the potential risks and benefits of intervention? Why are
courts so interventionist in divorce-custody cases, while they are comparatively
“hands off” in child-protection cases? Judges and policy makers might
reconsider the theoretical rationale for treating separated parents differently
from married parents—and as result might want to consider treating the two
categories of parents more similarly.
A reconsideration of these broad issues underscores the timeliness and
modesty of smaller steps in the direction of treating parents who live apart more
like married parents. One small yet important step would be for the law to
recognize the importance of the coparenting relationship, as it does the marital
relationship, by presuming that a parenting arrangement laid out in an
agreement between parents who live apart is in the best interests of their
children—and declining to look at other best-interest factors in the presence of
74
such an agreement. Courts would still retain jurisdiction over custody disputes,
sympathetic to the constitutional argument, the present analysis is more circumscribed and based on
evolving views of the need for cooperation between coparents who live apart.
74. Vermont law indicates that parental agreements are presumed to be in children’s best
interests. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 666 (2012). West Virginia is more stringent: West Virginia law
provides that “[i]f the parents agree to one or more provisions of a parenting plan, the court shall so
order.” W. VA. CODE § 48-9-201(a) (2009). More broadly, the ALI offered a similar proposal: “(1) The
court should order provisions of a parenting plan agreed to by the parents, unless the agreement (a) is
not knowing or voluntary, or (b) would be harmful to the child.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.06 (2002). The ALI proposal was based on
considerations more practical than the theoretical ones outlined here:
The law in most jurisdictions grants courts, as part of their parens patriae authority, the
authority to review a private agreement at divorce to determine whether it serves the child’s
interests. This section takes a more deferential view toward an agreement parents make about
their children, requiring the court to adopt an agreement to which the parents have agreed at
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and the best-interests standard would remain the prevailing standard for
deciding child custody. Issues that might involve child abuse or neglect would
not be subject to the presumption in favor of parental agreement, as is the case
for married families. However, the law would embrace a rebuttable
75
presumption (or perhaps even a deferentially irrebuttable one) that parental
agreement is the first and overriding consideration in children’s best interests
for separated, divorced, or never-married parents. If parents agree, other bestinterests factors are not considered and cannot trump parental agreement.
A second modest step would be for the law to limit court access for parents
who live apart based on the nature or frequency of their disputes. Based on the
same public-policy considerations as apply to married parents, courts might
limit repeat litigation by raising the bar for a change of circumstances. Courts
could also refuse to hear more minor parental disputes, for example, about
extracurricular activities or day-to-day parenting decisions. However, parents
who live apart would still retain access to courts to resolve the broader issues
encompassed in physical and legal custody.
Much like Sisson, these proposed reforms would embrace the philosophy
articulated for married parents that “[t]he vast majority of matters concerning
the upbringing of children must be left to the conscience, patience, and selfrestraint of father and mother. No end of difficulties would arise should judges
76
try to tell parents how to bring up their children.” Unlike Sisson, however, the
embrace of this philosophy would apply to agreements between parents who live
apart, while it currently applies to disagreements between parents who are
married.
These reforms, although modest, could have numerous and far reaching
practical benefits. Several specific direct and potential consequences of these
changes in custody law are detailed in the following subparts.
A. Elimination of Judicial Review of Consent Agreements
In most jurisdictions, judges have the authority to review consent
agreements between separated, divorced, and never-married parents regarding
77
their legal- and physical-custody settlements. The theoretical rationale for this
judicial authority is that the court is obligated to protect children’s interests
the time of hearing, except when the agreement is not knowing or voluntary or when it would
harm the child.
Id.
75. In deference to agreements in which each parent has informed knowledge and neither is
coerced into agreement, West Virginia honors knowing and voluntary parental agreements as long as
they are not harmful to the child. W. VA. CODE § 48-9-201 (West 2009). Other states require judges to
defer to more limited parental agreements. For example, Oregon does not allow judges to order sole
custody when parents agree to joint custody. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.169 (2013).
76. People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 2 N.E.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. 1936). Some commentators might also
make the constitutional argument that parents, whether married or not, have a fundamental right to
make decisions, good and bad, about their own children. See Jellum, supra note 72, at 664.
77. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.06 (2002).
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78

over and above any agreement between the parents. Although the power to
overturn parental agreements is a logical extension of the judiciary’s obligation
to protect children’s interests, the obligation itself rests on the very assumption
Mnookin questioned: that judges are able to discern what is “best” for children,
at least better than their parents can, even in the absence of clear legal
79
guidelines defining “best.”
The fact that the parents are in dispute is another, broad justification for
80
judicial intervention in custody disputes between parents who live apart. Yet
there is no dispute when parents agree on custody, but judicial supervision
remains in place. On what grounds is such supervision justified? How can the
judiciary intervene in the decisions agreed to by parents who live apart, while it
simultaneously refuses to enter disputes about children between parents who
are married? Recall the Kilgrow finding, “Never has the court put itself in the
place of the parents and interposed its judgment as to the course which
81
otherwise amicable parents should pursue in discharging their parental duty.”
Does the law perhaps assume that, like status offenders, children whose parents
live apart are vulnerable and in need of supervision under the courts’ parens
patriae mandate? If not, why do courts retain authority to determine children’s
best interests even when parents have not asked for this guidance?
Many judges wisely and routinely decline to exercise their discretion to
overturn parental agreements. However, explicitly requiring courts to
automatically accept plans agreed upon by the parents would have many
benefits, including placing less administrative burden on judges, conveying a
greater respect for parents who do reach agreement, and helping to set the
expectation that parents should exercise their traditional authority and
responsibility for childrearing, even when parenting apart. The
recommendation to require judicial deference to parental agreements is a part
of the ALI’s extensive recommendations for changes in custody law, one the
82
ALI embraced on practical grounds. However, the straightforward policy also
would open the door for more basic philosophical reforms.
B. Strong Encouragement of Alternative Dispute Resolution
ADR would be strengthened if the law treated agreement between parents
who live apart as triggering a presumption that would override all other bestinterests considerations. As a philosophical statement, the new standard would
encourage the previously discussed range of dispute-resolution efforts, which
are designed to promote parental agreement. Mediation, even mandatory
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See generally id.
See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 260–61.
See id. at 232.
See Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885, 888 (Ala. 1958).
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.06 (2002) (“The approach to parental agreements taken in these Principles
assumes that courts have neither the time nor the resources to give meaningful review to all parental
agreements.”).
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83

mediation, would become not only an uncontroversial method of dispute
resolution but perhaps a favored method that would earn its categorization as a
84
form of primary—not alternative—dispute resolution.
The embrace of parental agreement as the overriding best-interests
consideration would also serve the very useful purpose of signaling to parents in
emotionally difficult circumstances that the law seeks their ongoing cooperation
as its primary consideration, and therefore, so must they. Encouraging a more
“friendly” coparenting relationship should also motivate more parents to
voluntarily consider options like joint physical custody, an arrangement that
promotes children’s psychological well-being in cooperative but not in high85
conflict circumstances. In addition, the overriding emphasis on parental
agreement should push attorneys toward reaching negotiated settlements,
support and embrace collaborative law, and give judges a clear justification for
strongly discouraging litigation in both represented and pro se cases. Finally, if
the embrace of parental agreement is interpreted as requiring that parental
contracts be honored and enforced, as we intend in the present argument, this
would support the development of a range of new, creative dispute-resolution
methods and techniques.
C. Honoring and Enforcement of Parents’ Contracts
1. Contracting for Arbitration
If the judiciary no longer had the authority to oversee and potentially
overturn parental agreements, this would clear the way for parents to enforce
their custody-related contracts. (Such contracts are currently unenforceable, at
86
least in theory, in most states.) For example, parenting coordination and other
dispute-resolution procedures that involve arbitration would benefit from
recognition of the parents’ right to make enforceable contracts about the
87
arbitrator’s authority. Today, parenting coordinators and other arbitrators get
83. All that is mandatory in mandatory mediation is attending one, educational session, perhaps
separately from the other coparent under certain circumstances (such as intimate partner violence). See
EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 13, at 138–39.
84. Mediation is designated as a form of primary dispute resolution in Australia, where nationwide
mediation is a mandated first step prior to a court hearing. Bruce Smyth, Richard Chisholm, Bryan
Rodgers & Vu Son, Legislation for Shared-Time Parenting After Parental Separation: Insights from
Australia?, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 109, 116–22.
85. See EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 13, at 113–15.
86. See Jellum, supra note 72. Courts in New Jersey recently have upheld the rights of divorced
parents to contract for the appointment of an arbiter for their custody disputes. Christina Fox,
Contracting for Arbitration in Custody Disputes: Parental Autonomy vs. State Responsibility, 12
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 547, 547 (2011). However, nearby New York follows the more typical
model that parents do not have that authority, because the agreement might not be in the child’s best
interests. See id. at 550. Of course, a legislative presumption or deference that parental agreement
overrides all other best-interests considerations would greatly strengthen and clarify the legitimacy of
parental-custody contracts.
87. In fact, the state of Pennsylvania recently eliminated the practice of parenting coordination,
indicating that only judges have the authority to make decisions in child-custody cases. See PA. R. CIV.
P. 1915.11-1 (2013).
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their limited authority to make decisions as an extension of judicial overview of
custody matters. In fact, the legitimacy of the delegation of authority is
questionable, especially in the majority of states that have no clear statutory
88
guidelines on the matter. Similarly, the finality of the parenting coordinator’s
decision also can be called into question under current best-interests
considerations. Yet, if the law honored and enforced parental contracts, this
would allow parents to delegate partial or full, one-time or ongoing authority to
their parenting coordinator. In short, allowing parents who live apart to agree
to delegate authority about their coparenting conflicts to a third party would
make parenting coordination simpler, clearer, and stronger while encouraging
the development of new forms of ADR.
Parental coordination is a widely embraced, growing practice that would
become much more firmly grounded and established by honoring agreements
made between separated, divorced, and never-married parents as the overriding
best-interests consideration. However, the potential benefits might extend well
beyond this single ADR procedure. As noted, parenting coordinators are
typically appointed only in repeat-litigation cases today. If their contracts were
enforceable, however, parents who live apart might employ the services of a
parenting coordinator early in their disputes, in order to reduce conflict quickly,
or at any other stage of the dispute-resolution process. Parents also might agree
to give decisionmaking authority to another figure such as a therapist, a trusted
relative, or a retired judge who might serve in an arbitration role on a one-time
or ongoing basis, a process that, in some cases, might embody the “wise elder”
89
approach the Professor Mnookin considered but rejected. In still other
circumstances, couples might sign prenuptial or prenatal contracts outlining
future dispute-resolution procedures and perhaps detailing future parenting
plans in the event of a rupture in their relationship. Most broadly, concerns that
the alternative dispute resolution of child-custody disputes undermines parents’
rights to a custody hearing would be allayed by a philosophy and specific
accompanying rules indicating that parents know what is best for their own
children, whether they are married or living apart.
2. Evolving Parenting Plans
Although few parents are likely to sign prenuptial or prenatal agreements,
parents might well choose to make other, binding commitments to alter custody
90
arrangements in the future if courts honored and enforced such contracts.
88. See Joi T. Montiel, Is Parental Authority a Usurpation of Judicial Authority? Harmonizing
Authority for, Benefits of, and Limitations on this Legal-Psychological Hybrid, 7 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y
364, 370 (2011).
89. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 289. In fact, at least one detailed proposal for allowing parents
to contract to appoint friends or mental-health experts as arbiters in their custody conflicts was
proposed contemporaneously with Professor Mnookin’s more fanciful suggestions. See Janet Maleson
Spencer & Joseph P. Zammit, Mediation-Arbitration: A Proposal for Private Resolution of Disputes
Between Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976 DUKE L.J. 911, 934.
90. Although not the primary focus of the present article, one can envision extending the
enforceability of parenting contracts to include nonbiological parents. One example is same-sex
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Consider the thorny problem of deciding upon a parenting plan for infants.
Many parents who live apart appear to be comfortable having an infant spend
substantially more time with one parent, often a breastfeeding mother, an
arrangement that protects the security of the psychologically critical parent–
91
infant attachment. This plan might only be acceptable, however, if the child
will gradually spend more and more time with the other parent, typically the
father, as is developmentally appropriate, perhaps evolving into fifty–fifty joint
92
physical custody by preschool or school age. The problem is that a father (or
mother) who agrees to substantially less time during infancy takes a
considerable legal risk, because under current best-interests interpretations, a
93
parental agreement to increase time in the future is unenforceable. Parents
cannot make such contracts, because judges, not parents, hold the ultimate
authority for determining children’s best interests.
Thus, a deferential parent who is willing, perhaps eager, to agree to a
cooperative and developmentally sensitive parenting plan that limits his time
now but increases it later would be wisely advised (from a legal perspective) to
fight for as much time as possible now, so as not to compromise his standing
94
later. Otherwise, his legal argument for more time will be weakened by a
prolonged period of relatively low contact. A valid agreement to increase
contact would legally protect parents and allow them to construct evolving
parenting plans that are adaptive from the perspective of child development.
The same argument applies to other circumstances and potential contracts.
For example, parents who live apart might plan to coordinate a move to a
distant location, but circumstances might dictate that it makes practical sense
for one parent to move first (with or without the children). Under current bestparents, particularly parents in states that do not allow them to marry or perhaps will not allow samesex parents to adopt a child together. As an imperfect alternative, these and other “social” parents
might sign parenting contracts that detail agreements about their present and future roles in
childrearing. Similar contracts might also be signed in open adoptions, in which a birth parent plans to
maintain an ongoing relationship with her child despite surrendering her rights in adoption. Such
circumstances raise critical questions that are beyond present considerations, such as, Who is a parent?
How many parents can a child have? Despite such unanswered questions, recognition of the validity of
parenting contracts has the potential to encourage committed, cooperative parenting in families with
parents that are separated, divorced, or never married. See Nancy D. Polikoff, From Third Parties to
Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples and Their Children, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 1, 2014 at
195.
91. See Samantha L. Tornello, Robert Emery, Jenna Rowen, Daniel Potter, Bailey Ocker &
Yishan Xu, Overnight Custody Arrangements, Attachment, and Adjustment Among Very Young
Children, 75 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 871, 878–79 (2013).
92. Evolving, developmentally based parenting plans are increasingly recommended by
psychological experts and are being adopted administratively as preferred standards by various courts.
See, e.g., ROBERT EMERY, THE TRUTH ABOUT CHILDREN 178 (2004); see also IND. PARENTING TIME
GUIDELINES § 1 (2013).
93. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.06 (2002).
94. Not only would a deferential father be well-advised not to give up time with his infant, but, for
strategic (not just psychological) reasons, a breastfeeding mother would be equally well-advised to seek
as much time as possible, given the court’s possible sympathy for her and her infant. The result, of
course, is likely to be a difficult custody battle that serves no one’s interests.
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interests interpretation, the contract might be held to be invalid, giving a
strategic advantage to a parent who retains (presumedly temporary) physical
custody of the children but then chooses to abrogate the agreement.
Honoring and enforcing parental agreements would also undercut other
forms of strategic maneuvering. For example, a parent might agree to remain in
geographic proximity of the other parent in exchange for receiving more time
with the children. Because that contract is invalid—presumably invalid in the
children’s best interests—the parent who has more time with the children might
have an advantage in seeking to make a geographic move with the children at
some later point in time. He or she might well have achieved a legal advantage
by strategically “agreeing” not to move.
D. Limiting Access to Litigation
A philosophy of treating parents who live apart more like married parents
also could be used to justify restricting access to court in some circumstances in
which separated, divorced, or never-married parents disagree, as is done in all
situations in which spouses disagree about parenting. In particular, courts might
want to restrict litigation in high-conflict divorces, cases that consume a
disproportionate amount of court time. Although “high conflict” can be difficult
to define, two examples in which limited access to litigation should benefit
courts and parents are (1) trivial disputes and (2) repeat litigation.
1. Trivial Disputes
Leading professionals in parenting coordination have noted that parenting
disputes in high-conflict, repeat-litigation cases typically are substantively
trivial. “Most of the disputes were minor, generated by one or both parents’
need to control, punish, or obstruct the access of the other, such as one-time
changes in the timeshare schedule, telephone access, vacation planning, and
decisions about the children’s afterschool activities, health care, child care, and
95
child-rearing practices.” Such observations make it clear that virtually any
dispute, no matter how small, can be sufficient to initiate legal action, requiring
judicial intervention and ultimately a best-interests decision. The absurdity of
this circumstance is underscored by the unending potential for new, equally
trivial disputes.
Many experts recognize the necessity of distinguishing substantial conflicts
about legal custody, which can be a legitimate reason for litigation, from
mundane parenting disagreements, which are not. For example, in their
recommendations for reforming statutory definitions of legal custody, the ALI
states, “Unless otherwise provided or agreed by the parents, a parent should
95. See Coates et al., supra note 50, at 247; see also Dana Prescott, When Co-Parenting Falters:
Parenting Coordinators, Parents-in-Conflict, and the Delegation of Judicial Authority, 20 ME. B.J. 240,
240 (2005) (“[T]he appointment of a [parenting coordinator] usually represents the culmination of
many failed effort at collaborative forms of dispute resolution. Simply stated, imposition of a [parenting
coordinator] means the delegation of the court’s constitutional and statutory authority to another
professional, with the resulting diminution of parental autonomy.”).
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have sole responsibility for day-to-day decisions for the children while the child
is in that parent’s custodial care and control, including emergency decisions
96
affecting the health and safety of the child.” What the ALI proposal lacks is a
clear statement that disputes about day-to-day parenting matters are not
actionable. A bright line is needed about what parenting matters courts will and
will not hear. For example, courts might address only issues formally designated
as determining legal custody, typically education, religious upbringing, and
elective medical care, but refuse to hear disputes about more minor issues such
as extracurricular activities.
The present concern is not to define where a legislature, jurisdiction, or
judge might draw a line. Rather, the point is to suggest that such limits appear
to be not only acceptable but also wise when one weighs the potential risks and
benefits of intervention in light of the philosophical considerations raised here.
Although a great many judges certainly must have refused to hear cases
involving repeat, trivial litigation, surprisingly, no state legislation currently
appears to explicitly restrict access to court based on this criterion. No dispute is
too minor to form the basis of a custody dispute.
2. Repeat Litigation
Although it does not restrict custody hearings based on the trivial nature of
a dispute, the state of Wisconsin discourages repeat litigation by limiting access
to court in the first two years following a judicial order. Legislation passed in
1987 to limit substantial modification of legal-custody and physical-placement
mandated that
a court may not modify . . . orders before 2 years after the initial order is entered . . .
unless a party seeking the modification . . . shows by substantial evidence that the
modification is necessary because the current custodial
conditions are physically or
97
emotionally harmful to the best interest of the child.”

This statute essentially raises the bar for the change of circumstances
needed to justify reopening a case from the typical, general best-interests
98
considerations to much more restrictive child-protection grounds. The law has
had the intended effect of limiting litigation, as research demonstrates that
notably few custody orders are modified in Wisconsin compared to other U.S.
99
states and other English-speaking countries. Whether Wisconsin’s law
restricting access to relitigation has benefited parenting, coparenting, and
individual well-being in separated, divorced, and never-married families is a
96. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.09 (2002).
97. WIS. STAT. § 767.325 (1989) (amended 2005). The act was amended in 2005 to replace “initial
order” with “final judgment,” with an indication that “[n]o substantive change in current law is
intended.” WIS. STAT. § 767.451 (2013). The continuity in the law indicates that the restriction has not
been effectively challenged and has remained in force for twenty-five years. Id.
98. After two years, Wisconsin law reverts to traditional and vague “change of circumstances”
criteria for modification. Id.
99. Bruce Smyth & Laurie Maloney, Changes in Patterns of Post-Separation Parenting Over Time:
A Brief Review, 14 J. FAM. STUD. 7, 13 (2008).
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theoretical question that has yet to be tested empirically. Yet the restriction
appears to be based on the same theory applied to married families that
(repeat) family litigation not only clogs courts but also interferes with parents,
parenting, and valued cooperation between parents who live apart. Although
such restrictions are not widespread, Wisconsin is not the only jurisdiction to
100
impose them on relitigation.
V
CONCLUSION
Professor Mnookin anticipated profound problems in deciding child custody
under the best-interests standard in the absence of a broadly accepted legal or
101
social definition of “best.” The problems with the indeterminate standard for
courts and for American families have multiplied in the decades following
Mnookin’s keen observations, with a demographic explosion in separation,
divorce, cohabitation, and nonmarital childbearing.
Mnookin suggested that a logical answer to the dilemma of indeterminacy
was to encourage parents to resolve their own custody conflicts cooperatively in
102
mediation and other forms of ADR. Empirical evidence gathered over the last
several decades indicates that mediation is not only effective in resolving a large
percentage of custody disputes otherwise headed for court, but also more family
friendly, promoting better relationships between parents and children and
between former partners who remain parents. Indeed, a hierarchy of disputeresolution techniques has been developed in recent years, so today only the
most intense conflicts are funneled into a contested custody hearing.
Although innovative in many respects, the discovery of the benefits of ADR
essentially is an ironic rediscovery of a principle long applied to married
parents: “No end of difficulties would arise should judges try to tell parents how
103
to bring up their children.” As in married families, contemporary social,
psychological, and legal models of separated, divorced, and never-married
families underscore that effective parenting is greatly influenced by conflict or
cooperation in the coparenting relationship between parents living apart. Much
like the relationship between married parents, the relationship between parents
who live apart is critical to their children’s well-being.
These observations lead one to contemplate a fundamental shift,
questioning justifications for the state automatically inserting itself between
parents who live apart—and thereby coming between parents and children as
well, due to the courts’ parens patriae duties. What philosophy underlies the
state’s potential intrusion into the half of American families where parents live
100. For state statutes similarly limiting relitigation, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-411 (2007),
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-131 (2013), 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601 (2009), KY. REV. STAT. § 403.340
(2006), and MINN. STAT. § 518.18 (2006).
101. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 262.
102. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 287–88.
103. People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 2 N.E.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. 1936).
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apart when U.S. courts clearly and consistently refuse to enter childrearing
disputes between married parents?
Although we raise broad philosophical questions about the grounds for legal
intervention, we do not advocate for wholesale abandonment of judicial
oversight in custody disputes, but instead offer two specific and modest
proposals for reform.
First, it is argued that agreements between parents who live apart should be
treated with the same “hands off” deference as are disagreements between
parents who are married. Specifically, we argue that parental agreements
should be presumed to delineate children’s best interests, overriding all other
best-interests considerations. This step would (1) eliminate judicial review of
parental agreements, (2) provide a strong philosophical justification for ADR,
and (3) allow parents to sign enforceable contracts to resolve custody disputes
in arbitration (including but not limited to parenting coordination) as well as to
commit to parenting plans that evolve over time (for example, a plan might
specify parenting time that changes from infancy into toddlerhood and the
preschool years).
Second, we argue against treating parents who live apart like married
parents by denying access to court for all parenting disputes. Instead, it suggests
that courts can and should limit court access for some disputes between parents
who live apart. In particular, (1) some parenting conflicts are so trivial so as not
to justify legal intervention, and (2) some parents are in such high conflict that
the bar for the “change in circumstances” justifying relitigation should be raised
from general best-interests considerations to very specific child-protection
concerns.
Although modest, these proposals could have important practical and
philosophical benefits. Practically, litigation should be reduced as ADR grows
along with the courts’ authority to encourage ADR and restrict litigation.
Philosophically, these steps would tell professionals, and most importantly,
parents, that even parents who live apart benefit from finding ways to work
together cooperatively in their children’s best interests.
Who knows what’s best for children? In theory and in practice, the answer is
their parents, whether married or living apart.

